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1. Introduction 
Different realities require different analytical ap-
proaches and policy responses. Latin America,1 like any 
other macro-region, has a complex religious history, 
ranging from the colonial predominance of Catholicism 
between the 16th and 19th centuries to a manifest mul-
tiplicity of religions in the last decades. However, 
whereas other world regions might have similar histo-
                                                          
1 In this paper the term “Latin America” encompasses only 
Spanish and Portuguese-speaking countries on the mainland. 
The Caribbean requires a separate analysis due to its diverse 
historical experiences (e.g. the Cuban path towards state athe-
ism in the aftermath of the Revolution). 
ries of colonial evangelizing regimes and comparable 
landscapes of religious diversity, the complexity of the 
Latin American experiences cannot be equated with 
the complexity of those regions’ religious histories and 
configurations. In this paper we argue that perspectival 
biases in the idea of multiple secularities and concep-
tual inaccuracies in the analysis of religious diversities 
in Latin America may be contributing to misunder-
standings of the challenges associated with social in-
clusion that the region faces today.  
Firstly, we will offer a legal historical overview of 
Latin America’s colonial background. We will argue that 
such a background and its religious dogmatism cannot 
be neglected in comprehensive accounts of contempo-
rary religious issues in Latin America. In our view, such 
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accounts must also include reflections about the fact 
that the growing religious minorities in Latin America 
are mostly Christian minorities. We will then address 
the literature that deals with “multiple secularities” 
across the globe and the literature that analyses reli-
gious diversity in Latin America. We will point out the 
former’s underrating of post-colonial cases and the lat-
ter’s conceptual imprecisions regarding Christian mi-
norities, religious diversity and pluralism. Our analysis 
will suggest how these gaps are detrimental to the un-
derstanding of secular and religious phenomena in Lat-
in America. After these preparatory discussions, we will 
present a descriptive-normative analytical model that 
can be used to provide a more comprehensive under-
standing of the complexity of the religious fields in Lat-
in America and their multiple degrees of secularities, 
diversities and pluralities. We will conclude with the 
observation that, by identifying and reflecting upon 
those complexities and degrees, it is possible to discuss 
with more precision the impact of religious phenomena 
on human rights and, by extension, on social inclusion. 
2. Religious Diversity in Latin America: A Legal 
Historical Overview 
In 1493 (shortly after receiving news about the West 
Indies), the Pope granted to the Spanish kings the ad-
ministrative control of the Catholic Church in the new 
territories, later confirming this decision with the Papal 
Bulls of 1501 and 1508; in 1514 he extended this privi-
lege to the Portuguese kings. The system was called 
Royal Patronage (Patronato Real or Padroado Real). 
Iberian crowns enjoyed the prerogative of appointing 
bishops in their colonies; hence, the civil and ecclesias-
tical administrations often overlapped. The Iberian 
empires throughout the colony banned non-Catholic 
religions (particularly Judaism, Islam and Protestant-
ism) in the Americas with relative success. The Span-
iards adopted a cross-and-sword policy of expulsion 
and forced Christianization in both the Iberian Peninsu-
la and the Americas (Prien, 2013, pp. 3-11). Small num-
bers of Jews and Muslims fled to America after being 
expelled from Spain (1492) and Portugal (1497), but 
many of them converted to Christianity to avoid perse-
cution from the Inquisition. A few native peoples (e.g. 
Cunas, Mapuches, Amazonian Indians) managed to es-
cape from Iberian rule and were able to maintain, to a 
great extent, their cultural identity; similarly, Africans 
who escaped slavery and formed autonomous settle-
ments could partially preserve their religious traditions. 
But most African and indigenous peoples (were) con-
verted to Christianity—though some of their beliefs 
and religious practices remained, hidden, through syn-
cretism (Rauhut, 2012). The absence of competing reli-
gions resulted in an absolute religious intolerance. 
While in Europe the Augsburg principle cuius regio, eius 
religio could not be effectively enforced, leading to a 
proliferation of edicts of religious tolerance throughout 
the continent, the Iberian empires in America imple-
mented the Inquisition’s goal of the systematic control 
and extermination of sects, heretics and nonbelievers 
(Chuchiak, 2012). The region became the ultimate ex-
pression of the Iberian Counter-Reformation and was 
unable to develop any significant form of social conviv-
iality with other religions for almost four centuries. 
After the wars of independence (early 19th century), 
relations between church and state became a central 
dispute between the emergent political factions: liber-
als, who usually advocated for religious tolerance and 
encouraged secular authorities, and conservatives, 
who aligned themselves with the Catholic Church as a 
rule. Although liberals dominated the new govern-
ments, they were aware that religion was a powerful 
force for social cohesion in the effort to build a nation-
al identity in the political chaos of the post-
independence era. Thus, they assured the clergy that 
the Catholic Church would preserve its privileges. As a 
matter of fact, all the new nations were confessional 
states, and the Roman curia was forced to allow the 
new countries patronage rights (Prien, 2013, pp. 277-
278, 291-297). All Latin American Constitutions of the 
early nineteenth century declared their unrestricted, 
and in some cases perpetual, devotion to Catholicism 
as the state religion; in some cases, even private wor-
ship in other faiths was banned.2 All Latin American 
Constitutions adopted shortly after the Spanish Recon-
quista and restoration (1814–1820) maintained confes-
sional clauses, excluding any other religion.3 Two cen-
turies later, Costa Rica remains as the only confessional 
State in Latin America. Non-confessional constitutions 
in the mid-nineteenth introduced freedom of worship 
and religious tolerance, allowing missionary Protes-
tantism and immigration by Protestants,4 especially in 
Brazil and the Southern Cone. Nevertheless, Catholi-
cism was preserved as the state religion.5 In 1910, at 
                                                          
2 Cf. e.g. Article 1 (Chapter I) of the 1811 Federal Constitution 
of Venezuela; Article 4 (Title I) of the 1812 Constitution of the 
Republic of Cundinamarca; Article 10 of the 1823 Constitution 
of Chile. 
3 Cf. e.g. Article 8 of the 1823 Constitution of Peru; Article 5 of 
the 1824 Constitution of the Empire of Brazil; Article 5 of the 
1824 Constitution of El Salvador; Article 11 of the 1824 Consti-
tution of the Federal Republic of Central America; Article 3 of 
the 1824 Constitution of Mexico; Article 45 of the 1825 Consti-
tution of Guatemala; Article 5 of the 1825 Constitution of Hon-
duras; Article 3 of the 1828 Constitution of Chile; Article 8 of 
the 1830 Constitution of Ecuador; Article 6 of the 1831 Consti-
tution of Bolivia. 
4 Mostly from German-speaking countries, Denmark and the 
Netherlands. 
5 According to Prien (2013, p. 360), several constitutions grant-
ed religious tolerance, while preserving Catholicism as the 
state religion; for instance, in the Provincias Unidas del Río de 
la Plata’s (1819), and later in those of Argentina (1853), Brazil 
(1825), Uruguay (1830), Paraguay (1870), Chile (1833) and its 
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least 94% of Latin Americans were Roman Catholics; 
this percentage remained practically unchanged until 
the 1980s (Pew Research Center, 2014a, p. 26).  
Today, non-confessional constitutions represent 
the absolute majority in the region. Nevertheless, there 
are notable differences, resulting from dissimilar his-
torical paths and domestic political dynamics. Nine 
constitutions make at least a passing reference to God 
in their preambles (Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay and 
Peru). The concept of morals, which is invoked as a re-
striction on some rights and freedoms connected with 
religion, explicitly derives from one single religious tra-
dition (Catholicism) in Costa Rica, Panama, and Peru. In 
some countries (e.g. Nicaragua, Panama, and Peru) re-
ligious instruction in public schools is based on Chris-
tian values. The right to conscientious objection to mili-
tary service for religious beliefs is not recognized in 
several countries. In sum, when comparing Latin Amer-
ica’s contemporary challenges associated with religious 
diversity and social inclusion to those in other world 
regions, one should consider the crucial role of the co-
lonial experience in understanding the absolute pre-
dominance of one religion to the exclusion of any oth-
er; this background yielded divergent secularization 
processes, with specific regional and national paths, 
dynamics and targets. 
3. Religious Diversity in Contemporary Latin America 
Latin American nominal Catholics amount to nearly 
40% of the world Catholic population (Pew Research 
Center, 2014a, p. 4; Parker, 2005, p. 36). However, the 
percentage of people identifying as Catholic has fallen 
significantly. According to Latinobarómetro (2014, p. 
4), the percentage of Roman Catholics fell from 80% in 
1995 to 67% in 2013. A recent report by the Pew Re-
search Center (2014a, p. 14) suggests that there are 
some countries in Latin America whose nominal Catho-
lics may amount to half (El Salvador, Guatemala, Nica-
ragua) or less than half (Honduras and Uruguay) of the 
total population. Atheism, however, has not necessari-
ly increased.6 The emergence of non-Catholic religions 
and organizations in Latin America has been acknowl-
edged and studied in a number of works by social sci-
entists (e.g., Beltran, 2011; Bidegain & Demera, 2005; 
De la Torre & Gutiérrez, 2007, 2008; Fediakova, 2007; 
Ferre, Gerstenblüth, & Rossi, 2009; Forni, Mallimaci, & 
Cárdenas, 2003; Freston, 2011; Garma, 2007; Garvin, 
2005; Parker, 2005, 2012). In these works the concept 
of religious diversity has been put forward as an unmis-
                                                                                           
Ley Interpretativa (1865), Bolivia (1906), Peru (1915), Venezue-
la (1874), Honduras (1848, 1865, 1873) and Costa Rica (1860). 
6 In countries like Chile and Uruguay, however, the numbers of 
atheists, agnostics and religiously unaffiliated has remarkably 
increased (Pew Research Center, 2014a). 
takable fact in contemporary Latin America. The reli-
gious predominance that Catholicism enjoyed until the 
second half of the twentieth century has indeed been 
challenged by expanding religious minorities.  
However, there is a factual particularity that is 
worth pointing out. The growing non-Catholic minori-
ties in Latin America are mostly Christian7 minorities. 
Describing Latin America as “the world center of Chris-
tianity” (Freston, 2012, p. 80; our translation) might 
perhaps be an over-statement, but it is an unequivocal 
fact that the majority of the non-Catholic minorities 
spreading across Latin America are historical or emer-
gent forms of Protestantism. In this sense, we observe 
two complimentary processes of religious migration: 
an inter-American flow of religious denominations and 
a conversion from Catholicism to Protestantism. The 
former is a process that spreads from the United States 
and Brazil towards the rest of the continent. Apart 
from the historical Protestants who arrived starting in 
the 19th century, the first agents of this migration wave 
were U.S. missionaries who were no longer allowed to 
travel to China after 1949 and were sent instead to Lat-
in America (Prien, 2013, p. 553). With the exception of 
Uruguay, a wide spectrum of Anglo-American denomi-
nations has achieved a remarkable presence in all Latin 
American countries, in particular, in Brazil and Central 
America (Table 1); these include Baptists, Pentecostals, 
Presbyterians, Methodists, and Adventists. Additional-
ly, several Brazilian Pentecostal and neo-Pentecostal 
churches have also penetrated the Andean region and 
other Latin American countries—e.g. the Igreja Univer-
sal do Reino de Deus and Deus é Amor. 
It could be said that the migration process above is 
being consolidated or extended through a complimen-
tary process of conversion. That is, current religious 
minorities are also the result of individuals who decide 
to convert (Freston, 2012) to another Christian religion. 
At least a third of current Protestants were raised as 
Catholic and half or more say they were baptized as 
Catholics. Interestingly, 60% of converts to Evangelical-
ism said that one reason they left the Catholic Church 
was their desire for a more assertive teaching on moral 
questions and greater commitment, reflected in con-
servative positions on typical hot-button issues (Pew 
Research Center, 2014a, pp. 5-6). The resulting reli-
gious landscape is a particular one. 
If figures from the latest survey by the Pew Re-
search Center (2014a) are considered, only 8% of the 
total population in Latin America would be religiously 
unaffiliated, and 88% would be Christian (19% 
Protestants and 69% Catholics). Results from the World  
                                                          
7 By referring to this comprehensive category, we want to con-
vey not an idea of hierarchical “varieties” of a single religion 
(Catholicism) but their theological, ritualistic and socio-political 
coincidences—regardless of whether these are seen as deriva-
tive or independent. 
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Table 1. Percentage of Catholics and Protestants. 
 Country Estimated Population 
2013 (millions) 
Catholics Protestants/ 
Evangelicals 
Total 
Christians 
Countries with 
absolute Catholic 
dominance (>70%) 
Paraguay 6.6  90% 6% 96% 
Mexico 116.2  83% 5% 88% 
Peru 29.8  81% 13% 94% 
Ecuador 15.4  80% 11% 91% 
Colombia 45.7  80% 14% 94% 
Bolivia 10.5  78% 16% 94% 
Argentina 42.6  76% 5% 81% 
Panama 3.6  75% 20% 95% 
Chile 17.2  70% 15% 85.% 
Countries with 
significant 
Evangelical influence 
(>20%) 
Brazil 201 64.6% 22% 86.6% 
Costa Rica 4.7 63% 23% 86% 
Guatemala  14.4  59% 36% 95% 
Nicaragua 5.8 53% 28% 81% 
El Salvador 6.1  51% 33% 84% 
Honduras 8.4  47% 36% 83% 
Countries without 
religious dominance 
Uruguay 3.3 45% 10% 55% 
Source: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. International Religious Freedom Report for 2013. 
Table 2. Percentage of Christians and non-Christians.  
Affiliation/Country Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Ecuador Peru Uruguay 
Total Christians* 71.2 78.9 75 77.1 76.1 86.8 31.2 
Total non-Christians 10.9 5.6 0.2 1.1 0.3 1.7 7.5 
Other; Not specific 9.7 1.2 0 0.9 0.3 1.4 7.3 
Spiritist 0 3.5 0 0 0 0 0 
Espirit, candomble, 
umbanda, esoterism, 
occultism 
0 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 
Buddhist 0.5 0.2 0 0.1 0 0 0 
Hindu 0.2 0 0.1 0 0 0.2 0 
Jew 0.3 0.1 0.1 0 0 0 0.2 
Muslim 0.2 0.1 0 0.1 0 0.1 0 
None 16.9 15 23.1 21.4 23.5 10.1 60.7 
Don't know/No answer 0.9 0.6 1.7 0.3 0.1 1.5 0.6 
N= 1,030 1,486 1,000 1,512 1,202 1,210 1,000 
Source: Adapted from figures obtained through World Values Survey’s online-analysis tool, wave 6, 2010–2014. * Ro-
man Catholics, Protestants, Christians, Evangelicals, Pentecostals, Jehovah Witnesses, Mormons, 7th Day Adventists 
and Orthodox. 
Values Survey are somewhat more conservative, but 
the pattern is also noticeable. Table 2 presents the 
most recent figures (waves 2011–2014) from the World 
Values Survey on religious denominations in some 
countries in Latin America. Although there are excep-
tional cases like Uruguay, this survey suggests that 
more than 70% of the population in Latin America is 
nominally Christian even in countries such as Argentina 
and Brazil, where non-Christian minorities are compar-
atively significant. 
If the figures in Table 2 are compared, for example, 
to the more even distribution in the Asia-Pacific zone 
of Christians (7%), Muslims (24%), Unaffiliated (21%), 
Hindus (25%), Buddhists (12%), Folk religions (9%), 
Other religions (1%) and Jews (<1%) (Pew Research 
Center, 2014b), it is possible to state that the “religious 
diversity” label might have been used in Latin America 
too liberally and without the necessary nuances. 
Granted, the unique institutional/group identity, the 
doctrinal-theological specificities, and the particular 
socio-political histories of Christian minorities—as well 
as the diversity within Catholicism8—must be acknowl-
                                                          
8 Catholicism, as a global religion, is not only a mirror of the di-
verse societies where it can be found (Levine 2014), it also 
comprises a number of sub-institutions (e.g. religious orders, 
convents, schools, charities, etc.) and hierarchical structures 
(e.g. parishes, dioceses, bishoprics) whose direction by differ-
ent individuals or groups across a multiplicity of historical peri-
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edged and carefully reflected upon. However, it would 
be misleading to assume that there are no similarities 
between some of these minorities’ theological princi-
ples and moral-political stances and those found in Lat-
in America’s Catholicisms. From a global perspective, 
Latin America still exhibits low levels of diversity, com-
prising, as it does, a majority of Christian, mostly con-
servative, confessions. Notwithstanding the theological 
antagonisms and mutual distrust among Protestants, 
Evangelicals and Catholics, it is not unusual to find co-
inciding conservative stances among them on social is-
sues such as marriage, family, sexual orientation, re-
productive choices, gender relations, education and 
personal autonomy. In these areas crucial for social in-
clusion one could speak of a Christian hegemony. This 
is characterized by the persistence of unequal rules of 
the game in the religious market; high control by 
churches over the educational system; promotion of 
traditional (Christian) values and views on personal au-
tonomy (which leads to discrimination in workplaces 
and in schools, for instance); legitimation of sexism, 
homophobia, transphobia and other forms of discrimi-
nation; and/or the criminalization of abortion and 
stigmatization of women. From a legal point of view, 
such a framework creates inconsistencies with interna-
tional human rights standards. 
From this brief overview we can conclude that Latin 
America’s religious fields diverge from those in the U.S. 
and Europe, where challenges arise instead from large 
waves of immigrants bringing with them their Christian 
and non-Christian religions. Similarly, Latin America’s 
challenges are not those of African and Asian states, 
which have adopted Islam as an official religion and 
where minority faiths are discriminated against, con-
version is punished, and several forms of religious-
related violence are common. The challenges in Latin 
America are different. While all Latin American coun-
tries ban religious discrimination, recognize religious 
freedom, and protect indigenous religiosity, most of 
them remain countries where Christian denominations 
prevail and where religious equality is far from being 
achieved outside of constitutional texts. 
4. Perspectival and Conceptual Shortcomings  
In our view, there are two sets of literature on secular 
and religious diversities that are crucial to understand-
ing Latin America’s religious fields. The first offers a 
comparative framework of multiple secularities across 
the globe; and the second refers to the religious diver-
sity/pluralism in Latin America. We will argue that 
there are critical shortcomings in both sets and also po-
tential contributions between them if those very short-
comings are worked out. We will argue that multiple-
                                                                                           
ods and world regions yields greater diversity in performative 
and ideological terms. 
secularities approaches do not necessarily overcome 
the west-and-rest discourse and can be further im-
proved by considering the case of Latin America, yet 
without the conceptual overlapping between the ideas 
of religious diversity, plurality and pluralism that can be 
found in some scholarly works on this region.  
Modernity in the west-and-rest discourse is con-
ceived as a European innovation that has been globally 
transferred and whose European standards are the ar-
rival point of every modern society (Hall, 1996). For 
decades, postcolonial authors have deconstructed this 
discourse (Boatcă, 2015, pp. 201-226; Costa, 2006, pp. 
83-97; see also Bhambra, 2007; Chakrabarty, 2000). 
Recently, some debates on secularisms and religious 
diversity have considered the postcolonial critique of 
Occidentalism and have adopted a “multiple moderni-
ties” approach. A group of scholars, for instance, has 
proposed a model of “multiple secularities” which “ac-
quire different shapes in different countries”, for they 
operate “according to different cultural logics that 
document specific social histories of conflict”; these 
secularities, in a sense, “‘respond’ to specif-
ic…reference problems and offer ‘solutions’ to them” 
(Schuh, Burchardt, & Wohlrab-Sahr, 2012, p. 358; see 
also Wohlrab-Sahr & Burchardt, 2012). In a later publi-
cation, Burchardt, Wohlrab-Sahr and Middell (2015) 
accounted for these problems and distinguished four 
analytically ideal (not normative) types of secularities 
(see Table 3). 
Table 3. Multiple secularities. 
Reference Problems Ideal types (Secularity for 
the sake of…) 
Individual freedom vis-
à-vis dominant social 
units  
…individual rights and 
liberties 
Religious 
heterogeneity and the 
resulting potential or 
actual conflictuality 
…balancing/pacifying 
religious diversity 
Social or national 
integration and 
development 
…societal or national 
integration and 
development 
Independent 
development of 
institutional domains 
…the independent 
development of functional 
domains of society 
Source: Own elaboration based on Burchardt et al. 
(2015). 
To these four problem-secularity type combinations 
the authors add four accompanying groups of “guiding 
ideas”: freedom and individuality, toleration and re-
spect, progress and modernity, and rationality and au-
tonomy, respectively. These guiding notions are nor-
mative “reference point[s]” that legitimize “religious-
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secular distinctions” (Burchardt, Wohlrab-Sahr & We-
gert, 2013, p. 615) and are held by individuals, groups, 
states or functional domains. We agree with the au-
thors as to the convenience of separating the notion of 
the secular from linear narratives of modernity and 
underlining the historically contingent meanings of the 
secular and the different starting and arrival points of 
the societies studied. We also prefer the concept of 
“secularity” over “secularism” (which is usually re-
stricted to the relationships between organized reli-
gions and the state) as a way to extend the analysis to 
the relations between the triad of state, organized reli-
gions, and society with its functional domains, e.g. ed-
ucation, science, media, business. In this sense, the 
concept serves to remedy what Frigerio and Wynarczyk 
call the “dominant model” (2008, p. 248) in analyses of 
religious fields—the exclusivist emphasis on the 
churches and the state alone that can be found in the 
specialized literature on Latin America (e.g. 
Amuchastegui, Cruz, Aldaz, & Mejia, 2010; Blancarte, 
1994; Levine, 2009; Masferrer, 2013; Moran, 2013; 
Parker, 2012; Sawchuck, 2004) and beyond (e.g. Lavinia 
& Turcescu, 2011; Robbers, 2005). Nevertheless, this 
model may not overcome the west-rest bias. The 
groups of “guiding ideas” in each combination above 
are analytically useful but include complex concepts 
which, at least in some post-colonial societies, consti-
tute implicit or explicit (quasi)epistemologies—e.g. 
progress, modernity and rationality—that have guided 
secular and non-secular individuals, states, groups and 
functional domains alike in a variety of projects, con-
troversies and disputes. It is therefore not surprising 
that the authors find difficulties in inserting the case of 
South Africa into their model. They acknowledge that 
whereas modernity in the West meant a “struggle be-
tween Christianity and secularizing and secularist forc-
es,” Christianity in South Africa “became fundamentally 
intertwined with modernity” (Burchardt et al., 2013, p. 
621). What would happen then to the model if it were 
constructed from the outset with this type of “excep-
tional” (postcolonial) cases? The case of Latin America 
is a useful one because it represents, first off, a region 
where “cultures of secularity” (Wohlrab-Sahr & Bur-
chardt, 2012, p. 888) as well as religious cultures and 
phenomena—emerging religious minorities included—
fill the social landscape and the discursive space. 
However, in our view, some scholarly debates 
about Latin America’s religious diversity do not neces-
sarily offer a sound analytical platform upon which an 
alternative model—aimed at understanding not just 
multiple secularities but multiple religious phenomena 
beyond those of the West—could be constructed. In 
some scholarly works on Latin America’s religious phe-
nomena the concepts of diversity, plurality and plural-
ism are used interchangeably either as descriptors of 
the simultaneous presence of different religious de-
nominations or as counterparts to concepts such as re-
ligious monopoly, hegemony, uniformity or majority. 
For instance, in a work on religious diversity in Latin 
America, an author asserts that “there is already a Lat-
in American religious pluralism which is based in a 
growing diversity of heterogeneous cultural expres-
sions.” Later on, however, he explains this “religious 
pluralism” by referring circularly to the “diversity of be-
liefs” (Garma, 2007, p. 50). In a major work on religious 
diversity in Mexico, the introductory chapter points to 
the need to study the scope of “the diversification and 
the religious plurality” in Mexican indigenous localities 
(De la Torre & Gutiérrez, 2007, p. 14), thus implying the 
occurrence of two different realities, yet no conceptual 
distinction between these two concepts is provided in 
the text—instead the terms religious pluralism, plurality, 
diversity and diversification seem to be used inter-
changeably (2007, pp. 7, 9, 11, 14, 15). Similarly, in an in-
troduction to a co-edited volume on religious diversity in 
Colombia, “religious plurality” is accounted for by the 
“religious diversity” (African religions, Sephardic Juda-
ism, Islam) reportedly found in Latin America during co-
lonial and postcolonial times (Bidegain, 2005, p. 15). 
These conceptual-analytical imprecisions have been 
pointed out by other authors. Frigerio and Wynarczyk 
(2008) refer to the importance of Beckford’s conceptual 
distinction between pluralism as i) “the magnitude” of 
religious diversity, ii) the extent to which religious minor-
ities are “accepted” in a society and iii) the acknowl-
edgement of the “moral and political value” of religious 
diversity (2008, pp. 233-234). In the view of these au-
thors, the mere presence or growth of religious diversity 
does not necessarily equate to pluralism in sense ii) and, 
more importantly, in sense iii), that is, pluralism as the 
positive sanction of the moral and political relevance of 
new religious expressions and organizations. For plural-
ism to exist, the authors assert, there must be a fair 
“regulation” of the “religious market” (2008, p. 248), 
where the state as well as non-state institutions, such as 
NGOs and mass media, sanction the extra-religious im-
portance of religious minorities. Frigerio and Wynar-
czyk’s conceptual distinctions are similar in principle to 
Levine’s. Levine (2009) distinguishes between religious 
plurality and religious pluralism. The former equates to 
the existence of religious diversity, that is, the quantita-
tive presence of religious groups, denominations, and 
churches; religious pluralism goes beyond this presence 
and amounts to “the construction of rules of the game” 
(2009, p. 407; see also Freston, 2012, pp. 87-88) that 
give equal rights and legitimacy to the newcomers in the 
religious field. For Levine plurality serves as a necessary, 
though insufficient, condition of pluralism. From a 
stronger normative position, Eck (2001) had suggested 
earlier a similar clarification of religious pluralism. For 
this author, as well, religious pluralism does not amount 
to religious diversity. Firstly, whereas religious diversity 
is just “an observable fact,” religious pluralism, in the 
author’s view, must be “real engagement” with the re-
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ligious other; secondly, whereas religious diversity en-
tails only tolerance, religious pluralism also demands the 
understanding of the religious other and the overcoming 
of “stereotypes and prejudices”; thirdly pluralism must 
not become “valueless relativism” but must rather 
strengthen “the health of religious faith” (2001, pp. 69-
71). Eck notes as well that pluralism does not refer to a 
given state of affairs but to “the ongoing work of each 
generation” (2001, p. 72). 
With the above shortcomings and conceptual guide-
lines in mind, we now propose an analytical frame fo-
cused on the concrete hegemonic framework of Latin 
America and the conceptual distinctions between, and 
degrees of, secularities, diversities and pluralities. 
5. A Three-Dimensional Model of Religious Pluralisms 
In this section we describe both a series of key dimen-
sions and a scale of degrees by which those dimensions 
can be analysed and referred to in debates on religious 
diversity, religious plurality and social inclusion, as de-
picted in Figure 1. 
Firstly, we propose three key dimensions as axial 
categories that represent, in our view, the most im-
portant subfields in a given region’s religious field/s: 
society, organized religions and the state. What we 
suggest is to regard them as institutions but also as in-
terdependent sub-fields of forces; that is, partly auton-
omous and partly dependent axial spaces where sym-
metric and asymmetric relations of power between in-
dividuals, groups and institutions take place either in 
manifest or latent forms (Lukes, 2005). By referring to 
them as currently existing sub-fields we do not mean 
clear-cut spaces whose analysis concerns only present-
time phenomena. These are dimensions whose consti-
tution is to varying degrees related to their historicity. 
Thus we understand the organized religions dimension 
as one of the religious field’s subfields, where historical 
churches and emergent organized religions and syn-
cretic cults can be found either separate from each 
other or connected through symmetric or asymmetric 
links. In the same fashion, we suggest looking at the 
state not as a macro-institution but as a dimension 
where struggles for, and the granting of, religious rights 
take place. Similar to Frigerio and Wynarczyk’s pro-
posal (2008), our axial spaces include the society di-
mension. Yet we do not understand “society” as partic-
ular organizations and mass media that regulate the 
religious market (2008, pp. 228-229), but more gener-
ally as a subfield that is constituted by a wide range of 
individuals and groups that interact or not in a given 
context and can range from the atheist or the non-
believer to the religiously-unaffiliated and the reli-
giously-(multi)affiliated. 
 
Figure 1. A three-dimensional model of religious pluralisms. 
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The second particularity of our model is aimed at over-
coming the implicit and explicit binarisms in the litera-
ture on the emerging religious diversity in Latin Ameri-
ca by adding degrees which can further qualify the 
three dimensions above. Like Eck (2001), Frigerio and 
Wynarczyk (2008) and Levine (2009), we sustain the 
analytical relevance of distinguishing between the 
quantitative emergence of religious diversity, the con-
figuration of religious plurality, and religious pluralism 
as a combined and ceaseless process. Following this 
logic, instead of conveying in our model the idea of so-
cieties that are “uniform” or “diverse” in terms of reli-
gious (un)affiliation; “hegemonic” or “plural” in the 
subfield of organized religions, and “confessional” or 
“secular” with regard to the state, we want to convey 
multiple degrees of diversity, plurality and secularity 
that can be found in society, organized religions and 
state dimensions respectively. These degrees are not 
cumulative stages towards religious pluralisms; they 
are societal features that do not, and should not, nec-
essarily unfold sequentially. Each degree is meant to be 
analysed qualitatively, quantitatively or both, to assess 
how much of, and which specific manifestations of, the 
degree in question can be empirically verifiable in a 
given case. We consider it important to point out as 
well that the degrees, which we will expand on below, 
are based mostly on descriptive analytics but also on a 
cautious normative standpoint, upon which a flexible 
concept of ideal religious pluralisms will be conveyed. 
These ideal religious pluralisms amount to the degrees 
illustrated in Figure 1’s outer circular layer and are 
based on the idea that complete and permanent har-
mony, ecumenism and cooperation in societies 
(Mouffe, 2000) and religious fields might stand as de-
sirable teleologies and even practical goals but should 
not be regarded as necessary requirements for a sound 
religious pluralism. We will expand on these realistic 
expectations in the sub-sections below. 
5.1. The State Dimension 
As observed, secularity in Latin America mainly relates 
to the state protection of the rights of religious minori-
ties and the demise of the institutional privileges en-
joyed by the Catholic Church, rather than to the decline 
of religiosity or the retreat of religion from public spac-
es. Due to the secular paths taken in Latin America (i.e. 
usually from Catholic confessionality to impartial but 
non-atheist states) we basically distinguish between: 1) 
religious intolerance: confessional states where non-
adherents to the state religion are socially excluded 
and even private non-Catholic worship is expressly for-
bidden, creating favorable conditions for structural dis-
crimination against persons who do not accept the of-
ficial ideology or who oppose it; 2) religious tolerance: 
confessional states where religious minorities, alt-
hough being socially excluded to different extents, are 
allowed (rather than entitled) to hold religious cere-
monies in public, and the Catholic Church is supported 
by the government and enjoys other legal and political 
prerogatives; 3) religious freedom: confessional and 
non-confessional states that recognize the freedom to 
choose a religion or belief, consistently maintain a cer-
tain church-state separation and allow the legal recog-
nition of non-Catholic religions (including their rights to 
possess properties, land and media; to form political 
parties; and to declare political positions), but where the 
Catholic Church might retain some privileges in consid-
eration of its majoritarian status or cultural relevance for 
the nation; and 4) religious equality: non-confessional 
states that revoke the Catholic Church’s privileges and 
establish principles of state evenhandedness vis-à-vis 
theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs. 
5.2. The Society Dimension  
We suggest qualifying the degree of religious hetero-
geneity in society by contrasting the previous religious 
uniformity of Latin American colonial societies with 
their contemporary diversity and by breaking down the 
latter into a) invisible diversity, b) nominal diversity and 
c) reflexive plurality. Our starting point is the idea that 
a plural society should first and foremost know about 
the actual existence of the religious alternatives that 
can actually render that society plural. By proposing in-
visible diversity as an analytical distinction, we want to 
bring attention to the fact that there have been, and 
surely still are and will be, non-Catholic individuals and 
groups in Latin America whose religious or non-
religious profile is unknown beyond limited circles of 
state and/or religious experts. When the religious oth-
ers’ local presence is ignored by the majority of indi-
viduals and major groups (e.g. media, educational insti-
tutions, business, political parties, civic organizations, 
etc.), we can speak about a situation of invisible diversi-
ty. Individuals and groups in one of Mexico’s western-
central states may be aware of the presence of publicly 
active Jehovah’s Witnesses in the vicinity but individu-
als at large, and perhaps the local media or business 
sector, might not necessarily know about the presence 
of members of the “Marian Trinitarian Spiritualism” 
church (Sanchez, 2009). In such a case quantitative and 
qualitative assessments of what/how much religious 
diversity has been detected in a region can give a bet-
ter sense of how much invisible diversity prevails there. 
By nominal diversity we mean societies where there 
is both a factual presence of religious minorities as well 
as some major institutions, and/or individuals within 
those institutions, that do know about the presence 
and basic constitution of alternative religions and reli-
gious groups in that society. These are social institu-
tions and individuals, beyond limited circles of religious 
or state experts, which are relatively knowledgeable 
about general facts of those religious alternatives—
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their main doctrinal tenets or organizational character-
istics, for instance. Within this category it is also possi-
ble to distinguish between a) actively hostile scenari-
os—where religious minorities are discriminated 
against or attacked (Dias, 2012; Vallverdu, 2005, p. 62); 
and b) passive scenarios—where individuals affiliated 
to the majority religion are aware of the presence and 
basics of the religious others but have little or no desire 
to understand them further—and vice versa (Mendoza, 
2008, p. 202). 
We suggest reserving the term reflexive plurality for 
societies where individuals from different religious 
groups—as well as atheists—know about the presence, 
the basics and at least some of the substantial views 
and background of their religious counterparts. These 
societies may or may not enter into cooperative rela-
tions based upon such knowledge. We do not see soci-
eties with reflexive plurality from a radical idealistic 
viewpoint, that is, as perfect societies where every-
body knows with precision the history and doctrinal 
configuration of each religious alternative and where 
cooperation is therefore the norm (cf. Eck, 2001). For 
us, reflexive plurality does require openness and toler-
ance in order to be aware of prejudice (Eck, 2001), but 
such an openness can well remain as the base of a de-
tached understanding.  
5.3. The Organized-Religions Dimension 
As to the plurality of churches and other organized re-
ligions, Latin America is characterized by the historical 
monopolistic position of the Catholic Church. In some 
cases, this monopoly remained uncontested even after 
the post-independence secular reforms that took place 
at different points in time across the region. What has 
followed, after the nominal challenge of this monopoly 
over the last two centuries, are different types of non-
monopolistic dimensions of organized religion. From a 
descriptive position we distinguish two types: Catholic 
hegemony and Christian hegemony; from a normative 
position we distinguish one further type: dialogical plu-
rality. Catholic hegemony describes dimensions where 
the Catholic Church, as an internally-diverse majority 
church in most countries, co-exists with Christian mi-
nority churches as well as other religious groups, asso-
ciations or communities whose collective identity is not 
necessarily that of a church (as in the case of the Um-
banda; Prandi, 2004, p. 229). Notwithstanding this co-
existence, the Catholic Church and its ensemble of reli-
gious orders, Catholic groups and associations retain a 
clear religious and extra-religious (political, cultural, 
educational) pre-eminence (Levine, 2014; Levy, 1996). 
This Catholic hegemony is better apprehended if it is 
seen as the outcome of the historical religious and ex-
tra-religious activism of this church and its organiza-
tions. Regarding the case of Argentina, Carbonelli and 
Jones refer to such an outcome as a “cultural matrix” 
that has the capacity “to confer meaning on national 
identity and to shape state structures” (2015, p. 160; 
our translation). 
Similar to a duopoly, a Christian hegemony could be 
described as a religious field where the Catholic Church 
and Christian denominations share a dominant posi-
tion, which can result from various forms of coopera-
tion or unintended alignment on moral and extra-
religious issues (e.g. against reproductive rights, homo-
sexuality, same-sex marriage, euthanasia, etc.). 
Through extra-religious activism, direct intervention in 
politics and the operation of media channels and radio 
stations, Christian morals, values and worldviews thus 
continue to shape social relations and define the rules 
of the game. Brazil illustrates this case. According to 
Freston (1998), Brazilian Pentecostal churches—which 
themselves seek a hegemony within the Brazilian 
Protestant milieu—tend to have no united political 
front but do have an active presence in the country’s 
politics. Brazilian Pentecostal politicians have been 
elected as governors, federal deputies and city officials; 
in the most recent legislative period, they accounted 
for 12% of the seats in the Brazilian Congress (Macha-
do & Burity, 2014, p. 601). 
Dialogues are a main component of what we con-
sider as an organized-religions dimension with dialogi-
cal plurality. This is a plurality that describes religious 
fields where majority and minority religions and reli-
gious groups not only value (Frigerio & Wynarczyk, 
2008) their different or similar contributions to the re-
ligious and extra-religious dimensions but do so by 
openly communicating with each other (Vallverdu, 
2005, p. 63). This particular type of religious plurality 
may include interfaith dialogues as well as other (socio-
political) dialogues among the religious denominations’ 
lay members or non-“authorized” voices (Levine, 2009, 
p. 406). Nevertheless, dialogical plurality, just as reflex-
ive plurality in the society dimension, is not necessarily 
expected to produce cooperative engagement (cf. Eck, 
2001) or a harmonious ecumenism (cf. Hagopian, 2009; 
Parker, 2005). Even less are such dialogues likely to be 
an effective means of overcoming asymmetries of 
power. Nonetheless, we consider dialogues as condu-
cive to the creations of conditions of competence, dis-
sent and negotiation that may well contribute signifi-
cantly to progress towards more inclusive rules of the 
game. Here Frigerio and Wynarczyk’s notes on the role 
of social institutions are relevant. A sound level of dia-
logical plurality is manifested when majority and mi-
nority religions/religious groups alike are able to dia-
logue, under equal conditions of openness, with state 
institutions as well as with society’s civic groups, mass 
media, NGOs and other non-state organizations. 
6. Conclusions 
Drawing critically from the literature on religious diver-
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sity and the multiple-secularities approach, the analyti-
cal model we propose is aimed at overcoming Eurocen-
tric categorizations and conceptual imprecisions. The 
model above contains both descriptive and normative 
analytical categories whose even and balanced distri-
bution in Figure 1 is meant to represent neither sym-
metric dimensions in actual societies nor degrees of di-
versity, plurality and secularity that develop jointly in a 
linear fashion. Although the model does propose nor-
mative scenarios in the dimensions of state, religion 
and society, it is not meant to suggest a method which 
Latin American societies would have to undertake in 
order to develop and/or consolidate religious plural-
ism. The model above clarifies key concepts that can be 
used in specialized discussions and problematizes the 
interpretations of contemporary realities regarding the 
religious fields in Latin America. It is also a flexible ana-
lytical tool that can be adapted to local, national or 
transnational contexts and approaches. For instance, it 
can enable multi- or inter-disciplinary comparisons of 
degrees of secularities, diversities and pluralities that 
can be empirically observed across multiple local con-
texts—e.g. across Chiapas in Mexico, Chimborazo in Ec-
uador and Cauca in Colombia, where Protestant com-
munities have apparently developed in comparable 
terms (Gros, 1999). Once operationalized, the model can 
also be used as a framework for comparative analyses of 
the degrees of religious pluralism across different Latin 
American countries or regions; these comparisons can 
be quantitative or qualitative and generate, for in-
stance, indexes or typologies of religious pluralism. If 
the model is properly adapted—particularly the model’s 
departure point, i.e. the region’s historical background—
it can also assist comparative analyses of the develop-
ment of religious diversities/pluralisms, or other reli-
gious/secular dynamics, within and across postcolonial 
regions beyond Latin America. In any case, adaptations 
in our view would have to be cautious and preferably 
follow the non-Eurocentric, non-linear, complex (mul-
tiple dimensions and degrees) and realist rationale of 
the original model.  
Above all, we consider both the discussion and the 
analytical proposal above to be key inputs for contem-
porary debates on social inclusion. As suggested in this 
paper, there are conceptual and empirical links be-
tween the consolidation of reflexive plurality in society 
at large, the development of dialogical plurality among 
organized religions and atheist organizations and the 
attainment of religious equality in terms of equal rights 
granted by the state to organized religions. More im-
portantly, it can also be said that the development of 
reflexive and dialogical pluralities in the first two sub-
fields may facilitate not only the consolidation of reli-
gious equality among organized religions but also the 
de-centering of Christian values in public education and 
the granting by the state of gender equality, as well as 
comprehensive sexual and reproductive rights for all 
individuals regardless of their sexual orientation—
some of the crucial inclusive rights where there has 
been important progress on the legal and judicial 
fronts, but whose de facto fulfillment, and political de-
bate at times, has been somewhat hindered by hege-
monic churches and individuals’ religious beliefs alike. 
The decrease of Catholic or Christian hegemony and 
the increase of dialogical plurality among organized re-
ligions, coupled with the presence of a reflexively plu-
ral society, may not be sufficient yet remains a neces-
sary condition for the attainment of the aforementioned 
rights. A dialogical field of organized religions, together 
with societies whose reflexive plurality is high, may al-
so facilitate the legal application and extra-legal consol-
idation of those inclusive rights. The resulting religious 
pluralisms—or the reflexive and dialogical cultures, and 
legal frames, of equality, understanding and dissent—
provide, in principle, effective conditions for social in-
clusion. 
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